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Abstract: 
Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons in fiscal policy-making, as 
posited by standard political economy models? This article focuses on coalitions which have 
created high levels of familiarity through shared governing experience in the past and which 
are likely to cooperate again in future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have 
incentives to internalize the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreements to 
balance their constituencies’ fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broad coalitions should 
have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thus resulting with 
lower debt increases compared not only to less durable coalitions, but also to single-party 
governments. Comparing 36 OECD/EU democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I 
estimate the effects of coalitions’ cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The 
findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporal 
coordination problems and to reach specific policy goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Time is a central feature of democracies. Office terms limited through periodical elections 
confine political time horizons to relatively short segments (Linz 1998). But, under which 
conditions could politicians and political parties adopt longer time horizons that extend over 
the next elections? Although many policy reforms depend crucially on long-term orientations 
of political actors (Jacobs 2011), time perspectives of governments have often been neglected 
in the literature. In the fiscal policy literature, an implicit assumption is that coalition 
governments are particularly unable to adopt long-term time perspectives, and therefore, end 
up with higher indebtedness rates, deficits or government expenditure (Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006; Grilli et al. 1991; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Tsebelis 2002).  
However, parties with shared governing experiences in the past have created high levels of 
familiarity amongst each other, leaving them a substantial chance to cooperate again in the 
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same constellation in future governments (Franklin and Mackie 1983; Martin and Stevenson 
2001, 2010). Such coalitions should be concerned more strongly about the future costs of 
today’s debt developments, because they may have to face the consequences themselves. Based 
on these assumptions, this article explores the effects of coalitions’ prospects to cooperate in 
future governments on the development of their debt ratios. If governing parties expect good 
prospects for future cooperation, they should more credibly be able to refrain from unilateral 
spending demands for their own constituencies. 
This implies that fiscal outcomes under coalitions credibly committing to long-term policy 
goals should be indiscernible from single-party governments’ outcomes, which is in line with a 
recent study by Bäck and Lindvall (2015). Yet, fiscal policy-making goes beyond veto player 
and common pool resource problems commonly associated with coalition governments. 
Coalitions cooperating repeatedly based on their familiarity should also be able to forge broad 
political support and achieve consensus on electorally contested economic policies because of 
their ability to spread the costs and blame of reforms across coalition partners (Alexiadou 
2013; Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 2012). As a consequence, coalition governments can be 
expected to achieve debt outcomes even more favorable than one-party governments, provided 
they can settle for long-lasting cooperation and adjust their debt preferences under the “shadow 
of the future” (Lupia and Strøm 2008). 
Empirical evidence for this argument derives from a comparison of 36 democracies, 
OECD and/or EU member states, spanning the time period from 1962 (or since 
democratization) to 2013. Consistent with comparable studies, “prospective cooperation” is 
operationalized as a retrospective measure of past cooperation experiences of the current 
governing parties. The relationship between prospective cooperation and debt development is 
statistically investigated using time-series cross-sectional regression analysis. The main tests 
consist of “autoregressive distributed lag” models discerning between short-run and long-run 
effects. In addition, a government-centered data structure is employed based on cabinets as the 
unit of observation instead of country-years. 
The results show that the longer time perspectives of coalitions with a high chance for 
prospective cooperation are related to lower debt increases – compared not only to coalitions 
without durable cooperation patterns (Bäck and Lindvall 2015), but also compared to single-
party governments. Complementing the study by Bäck and Lindvall (2015), I discuss further 
theoretically relevant factors which condition the impact of coalitions’ time horizons: The 
fiscally beneficial effects of prospective cooperation are particularly pronounced in non-
election years and where fiscal pressure reduces the scope for “pork-barrel politics”. This study 
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challenges the implicit assumption of political-economy models that governments’ time 
horizon rarely exceeds the next election. Rather, based on the ability of governments for 
strategic behavior (König and Wenzelburger 2014; Müller and Strøm 1999), the findings are 
consistent with new research on the significance of intertemporal considerations in politics 
(Bejar et al. 2011; Bojar 2015; Hübscher 2015; Jacobs 2011). 
This article is organized as follows: The following chapter introduces the theoretical 
argument; the empirical section explains the operationalization of the variables, the statistical 
methods, and the results of the multivariate statistical analysis. Some implications of the 
analysis are discussed in the conclusion. 
 
2. Government form and debt dynamics 
Multi-party governments have frequently been associated with fiscally less beneficial debt, 
deficit, or expenditure policy outcomes compared to one-party governments in the literature 
(for an overview, see Alesina and Perotti 1995). First, early political-economy models 
diagnosed coalition governments with a “common pool” problem (Roubini and Sachs 1989; 
Weingast et al. 1981), which is furthermore exacerbated by fragmentation, i.e. a higher number 
of parties in government. Many fragmented governments have conflicting interests among the 
coalition partners. Rational government parties prefer to maximize spending for their own 
constituencies since they do not have to bear the overall costs alone (Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006; Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999; von Hagen and Harden 1995). In other words, 
coalitions are associated with higher budget deficits because they “externalize” the costs of 
additional expenditure for their preferred policy fields and want to shift the costs onto other 
groups within the coalition (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006, 253-54). 
Second, due to their fragmentation, coalition governments have difficulties in adjusting  
budget deficits because coalition partners shield their preferred policy fields from cutbacks 
while trying to shift the burden of fiscal adjustments to other coalition partners or external 
groups (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Roubini and Sachs 1989). The higher number of veto 
players and the greater ideological distance, compared to one-party governments, thus reduce 
the ability of coalitions to adjust to economic shocks (Tsebelis 2002, chapter 8). 
Third, it has been argued that coalition governments have higher debt ratios because they 
are more short-lived than single-party governments (Bejar et al. 2011; Grilli et al. 1991). In 
economic terms, unstable government forms have a higher “discount rate” of the future, i.e. 
they prefer immediate benefits over future benefits. Therefore, they act “myopically” as they 
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overvalue the benefits of present government spending compared with the costs of higher 
indebtedness ratios in the future (Grilli et al. 1991, 349). 
Yet, notwithstanding an abundance of studies, the empirical findings on the effects of the 
type of government are not uncontested (e.g. de Haan and Sturm 1997; Edin and Ohlsson 1991; 
Sakamoto 2001). One problem of fragmentation and veto player approaches is their uniform 
treatment of time horizons. The value of the future could increase for coalition partners 
expecting to remain in office for longer time periods. This would provide incentives to 
“internalize” the whole cost of their public policy decisions. Coalition bargaining, in fact, often 
takes place under the “shadow of the future” with incentives to make credible future 
agreements (Lupia and Strøm 2008). 
A second potential explanation for deviating findings is the debatable characterization of 
one-party governments as unitary decision-makers while coalitions are seen as heterogeneous 
decision-makers with divergent preferences that lead to collective action problems (Bäck and 
Lindvall 2015, 55). However, all parties represent coalitions of conflicting interests of societal 
groups. For instance, the German CDU is an example for intra-party federalism (Schmid 1990). 
One reason why parties exist is indeed to become durable coalitions (Aldrich 2011). Why then 
should the number of parties result in policy differences when several groups in society can be 
equally represented by both one-party and multi-party governments (Persson et al. 2007, 156)? 
Possibly, one-party governments are electorally accountable for all policy areas, while voters 
associate only policy subsets with each coalition party (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). However, 
this argument ignores that collaboration among parties raises their familiarity and facilitates 
repeated cooperation within the same constellation (Franklin and Mackie 1983), which makes 
coalitions appear more so as fixed entities over time. The assumption that only coalitions are 
non-unitary decision-makers becomes uncertain when multi-party governments are not as 
homogeneous and when coalition parties cooperate more sustainably than commonly assumed. 
 
Introducing time horizons: future cooperation prospects 
These tenuous assumptions make it questionable if all coalitions are actually distinguishable 
from one-party governments with regard to their time horizons. Coalition governments, I argue, 
should be even more capable than single-party governments to produce favorable fiscal policy 
outputs if their longer time horizon through “prospective cooperation” in the future permits 
them to credibly agree on debt-stabilizing policies. Behind this argument are three 
assumptions. First, coalitions with a shared past governing experience have higher chances to 
govern together in the future again, because they are familiar with each other. Second, such 
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coalitions are likely to internalize the future costs of indebtedness. Third, broad and durable 
coalitions can diffuse the electoral risks of contested fiscal policies more effectively than 
single-party governments. 
In detail, the first assumption states that parties in coalition governments see a chance that 
they might cooperate again in the future. Evidence comes from the coalition formation 
literature. Parties that regularly cooperated in the past have created high degrees of familiarity 
among each other (Franklin and Mackie 1983). The shared experiences of past government 
participation reduce bargaining costs for coalition agreements and go along with reputational 
benefits (Warwick 1996, 474). Furthermore, parties prefer keeping the same partners, as they 
know more about each other and are better able to communicate (Bäck and Dumont 2007, 
487). Incumbent coalitions with high familiarity therefore have higher chances to form the next 
government (Martin and Stevenson 2001, 2010). Conversely, the chance for prospective 
cooperation is reduced with dissention and betraying behavior in the past (Bäck and Dumont 
2007, 487; Tavits 2008). All these studies argue that the prospects for future cooperation are 
decisively influenced by the cooperation behavior in the past. Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that prospective cooperation can be assessed through past cooperation patterns. This 
assumption can be empirically tested by comparing varying retrospective measures of past 
coalition patterns. 
The second assumption of the argument is that parties care about the costs of high future 
indebtedness levels. Rarely, governments face positive economic shocks and end up with 
comfortable fiscal situations so they can sustain high budget deficits without constraints. More 
typically, higher debt ratios bear some undeniable long-term costs for all governments (Alesina 
and Drazen 1991; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Although this does not rule out debt as an 
economic policy option, it limits unrestricted indebtedness at the cost of future generations for 
parties expecting future participation in government. Coalitions with prospective cooperation 
will therefore have to budget these long-term costs and internalize them at some point, i.e. not 
shift them to external groups or to future governments. This assumption can also be tested 
empirically because fiscal pressure should moderate the incentive for coalitions to internalize 
the long-run costs of additional spending. 
While repeated participation in government and internalization of the future costs of debt 
accumulation can also apply to single-party governments, the third assumption concerns a 
unique characteristic of coalition governments. The literature on consensus democracies (for 
recent empirical evidence, see: Alexiadou 2013; Armingeon et al. 2015a; Katzenstein 1985; 
Lijphart 2012; Luebbert 1984) suggests that governments which are able to forge broad 
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coalitions with opposition parties and societal actors can more easily agree on electorally 
contested reforms. Coalitions with good cooperation prospects resemble such broad coalitions 
because they can support cross-party alliances over extended periods of time. They can gather 
broader electoral support for a long-term view on debt developments by exploiting 
opportunities to diffuse blame and responsibility for unpopular policies across coalition 
partners (Powell and Whitten 1993; Weaver 1986). On the other hand, although coalition 
governments with longer time horizons can agree on the goal of pursuing fiscal stabilization 
policies, the process of agreeing on – and implementing – status quo changes may still take a 
longer time relative to one-party governments due to the multiple veto actors involved 
(Armingeon et al. 2014; Tsebelis 2002). Yet, accounting for the more difficult process of 
reaching consensual policy positions, their advantages in including a broader spectrum of 
political actors into governmental decision-making should enable durable coalitions from 
keeping debt accumulation under control even better than single-party governments. 
Taken together, the causal mechanism of the argument has started from the common 
observation that, stemming from their fragmentation, coalitions have a “time-inconsistency 
problem” (Kydland and Prescott 1977) because without future perspectives, some coalition 
partners have electoral incentives to maximize spending on their preferred policy areas and 
externalize its costs (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). But from a critical examination of these 
assumptions about coalitions’ common pool resource and veto player problems, it follows that 
coalitions can overcome the time-inconsistency challenge if (a) they expect future cooperation 
in government, (b) they desire to avoid unreasonably high future debt levels, and (c) they 
represent broad societal coalitions which minimize electoral risks associated with controversial 
reforms. In these circumstances, coalition agreements that lead to farsighted fiscal policy-
making can be reached more easily because the partners are familiar with each other. Opt-out 
options – by leaving the coalition or sabotaging agreements with coalition partners – are 
associated with higher costs because the parties have to consider that their partners would not 
be likely to cooperate with them anymore in the future in such cases. The “walk-away value” 
for coalition bargaining (Lupia and Strøm 2008), or, the benefit of the bargaining leader for 
leaving the bargaining round, diminishes in such situations. The expectation of prospective 
cooperation therefore leads to a contract-like situation which relies on reciprocal trust and 
reputation, and which can be the source for credible long-term agreements (Kreps 1990; 
Majone 1996). This leads to the main hypothesis of this article about the fiscally beneficial 
effects of prospective cooperation: 
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H1: The stronger the prospects for future cooperation of a coalition government, the lower its 
debt increases compared to less durable coalitions and compared to single-party 
governments. 
With the goal of keeping debt accumulation in check, the credibility advantages of prospective 
cooperation facilitate a wide range of fiscal policy agreements. Possible examples include the 
capacity to freeze spending levels on existing levels, maintain deficit and/or debt ratio targets, 
set growth and employment objectives, agree on fiscal consolidation measures by reducing 
expenditures or increasing taxes, and commit to strict implementations of fiscal objectives. In 
practice, we find many instances where coalition parties openly refrain from unilaterally 
claiming fiscal resources for their own constituencies. For example, the Swedish center-right 
coalition – the traditional opposition block to the Social Democratic party – governing between 
2006 and 2014 committed itself to budget surpluses in both their 2006 and 2010 electoral 
manifestos.1 Grand coalitions in Austria – Christian and Social Democrats share a long history 
of co-governing – regularly agree on detailed coalition programs, such as a 288-page document 
for the 2008-2013 term which underlined the goal of a balanced budget with specific measures 
of fiscal consolidation.2 Another instance is Ireland’s center-left government of 1994-1997, 
characterizing itself as a “government of renewal”.3 Fine Gael and the Labour Party had 
collaborated three times between 1973 and 1987, expectedly facilitating the favorable 
outcomes of cyclically adjusted primary surpluses of more than 4 percent in 1995-1997. These 
three examples also stress that I expect longer time perspectives to facilitate fiscal outcomes 
irrespective of the ideological orientation of the governing parties involved. 
Are there alternative factors which condition the effectiveness of coalitions’ cooperation 
outlooks to contain debt dynamics? First, since fiscal policy sometimes co-varies with electoral 
cycles (Nordhaus 1975) and even governments with long-term cooperation prospects face 
electoral uncertainties (Jacobs 2011; Lupia and Strøm 2008), election years should temporarily 
suspend debt stabilization efforts of governments seeking re-election. Second, if the 
assumption is valid that parties care about the costs of future debt (see above), the incentives 
that cooperation involves long-sighted fiscal policy-making should be stronger when the 
government faces greater fiscal pressure. Third, even when governing parties agree on debt-
stabilizing policies, the effectiveness of fiscal outcomes may depend on the degree of 
centralization in budgetary institutions – especially in the delegation of fiscal authority to 
strong finance ministers (Hallerberg et al. 2009; Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). This leads to 
three sub-hypotheses: 
H2: The effects of prospective cooperation on debt changes are strongest in non-election years. 
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H3: The effects of prospective cooperation on debt changes are strongest under high fiscal 
pressure. 
H4: The effects of prospective cooperation on debt changes are strongest under high fiscal 
delegation. 
Whilst these factors are expected to moderate the strength of the effect of prospective 
cooperation, they are not necessary conditions determining whether cooperation effects take 
place at all. In other words, one should find evidence for lower debt growth of coalitions with 
long time horizons even during election years, under low fiscal pressure, and under low 
centralization of budgetary institutions. 
 
3. Data and operationalization 
The argument is put to an empirical test by comparing 36 post-industrial democracies: the 28 
EU member states, in addition to OECD member states Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. The data set comprises more than 600 
governments. Maximally, the observation period goes from 1962 to 2013, but starts only after 
the democratic transition of each country. Unless noted otherwise, all government data are 
from Armingeon et al. (2015b) and all political-economic control variables from Armingeon et 
al. (2015c). Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix provide details on the operationalization 
and descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
Debt change 
Following several studies, the dependent variable is the annual change (first differences) in 
gross general government debt ratios in percentage of GDP (Bäck and Lindvall 2015; Franzese 
2002). Debt data are based on OECD Economic Outlook and Eurostat sources, but time series 
are extended through backward extrapolation, mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, using data from 
the IMF (Abbas et al. 2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) (for details see Armingeon et al. 
2015c). Using non-extrapolated data yields substantially identical results (see the section below 
on robustness tests). Debt ratios correlate with measures of budget deficits, but may be less 
prone to “creative accounting” of governments (Alt et al. 2012). Since growth and interest 
payments also influence debt trajectories, debt changes encompass the entirety of public 
finance development both on the expenditure and revenue side. Nonetheless, my results are 
robust to alternative indicators, such as budget deficits or government expenditure. 
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Government form 
The differentiation between coalition/multi-party governments and one-party governments is 
the first important independent variable following from the theoretical argument (coalitions 
coded 1; one-party governments coded 0). 
 
Prospective cooperation 
“Prospective cooperation” encompasses current governing parties’ chance for a future 
participation in government in the same constellation. This measure is based on the idea of 
familiarity through shared past governing experience, which should enable governments to take 
a more credible long-term perspective on debt dynamics. It is detrimental for prospective 
cooperation if current coalition partners frequently governed with other parties or governed 
alone in the past. Such dissenting behavior reduces coalition partners’ familiarity and mutual 
trust (Tavits 2008); there is no stable foundation for long-term cooperation based on successful 
past collaborative experiences, thus damaging the credibility of fiscal policy agreements. 
The measure for prospective cooperation is constructed retrospectively and oriented 
towards past cooperation, following Bäck and Lindvall (2015) and similar measures by Persson 
and Tabellini (2009) and Martin and Stevenson (2010). It is assumed that each governing party 
judges the chances for prospective cooperation on account of its past cooperation experiences 
with other governing parties. Since familiarity is a dynamic concept that is developed over 
time, all cooperation experiences since 1960 are taken into account for all governing parties in 
the data set. 
However, there are reasons to “discount” past events because coalitions have to compare 
present benefits and future benefits facing uncertainty about the future (Lupia and Strøm 2008). 
For governments with higher discount rates, the potential for prospective cooperation should 
depend more strongly on recent government constellations than on patterns from decades ago. 
The functional form of how past government events have to be discounted is unclear a priori, 
though. Measuring democratic capital, Persson and Tabellini (2009, 101) are “agnostic” about 
the functional form and assume that democratic capital accumulates relatively slowly in 
democratic years but collapses rapidly if a regime becomes authoritarian. Past events are 
discounted with a geometrical depreciation function in this specification. For prospective 
cooperation, a similar intuition seems reasonable, in that familiarity is inherently developed 
over a longer time period than it can be disestablished. Bäck and Lindvall (2015) follow the 
logic of Persson and Tabellini (2009) and set the depreciation rate at 0.95. This leads to a 
weight of 0.950=1 for an event one year ago, 0.951=0.95 two years ago, 0.952=0.903 three years 
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ago, 0.953=0.857 four years ago, etc. Events about fifteen years ago carry half the weight of 
past year’s events. The closer the depreciation rate is to 1, the more all past events are weighted 
equally. The closer it is to 0, the more weight recent events carry. 
Martin and Stevenson (2010) also use discount rates for their measure of familiarity. They 
argue that familiarity provides insider information about coalition partners, but that this process 
depends on the collaboration of party leaders. Because they estimate average durations of party 
leadership in Western Europe at about eight years, cooperation events more than eight years 
ago are “almost completely discounted” (Martin and Stevenson 2010, 510). This would imply a 
depreciation rate of about 0.7 or 0.8. But, this may be too restrictive since depreciation rate 
events three years ago weigh only about half (0.72=0.49). Rather, a higher rate seems 
appropriate. In this article, I will mainly apply a depreciation rate of 0.95 – yet rerun all 
analyses for twenty different depreciation rates between 0.80 and 0.99 (online appendix). 
The actual calculation of the indicator is leaned on Bäck and Lindvall (2015) and 
correlates strongly with their measure (r=0.84, N=1,011).4 In an initial step, a measure for 
prospective cooperation is developed for each individual governing party 𝑗𝑗 in country 𝑖𝑖 in the 
year 𝑡𝑡: 
 Prospective cooperationi,j,t  = (1 − 𝛿𝛿)� 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏 ∗ 𝛿𝛿𝜏𝜏−1𝜏𝜏=𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0
𝜏𝜏=1
, (1) 
where 𝛿𝛿 is a depreciation rate (δ=0.95 in the main analyses). 𝜏𝜏 denotes all past observations 
that are taken into account for the calculation the indicator, starting with t-1 and ending with 
the first time point in the data set (1960 at the earliest). By multiplication with (1 – δ), the sum 
of all past observations of prospective cooperation is normalized to an interval between 0 and 
1. The degree of past cooperation is captured by 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝜏𝜏. If a current governing party (year t) 
has previously participated in government in year t – τ, there are three possibilities: 
 It gets a maximum value of α=1 if it was in a coalition with the exact same partners in the 
past year t – τ. 
 It gets a minimum value of α=0 if it was in a coalition with entirely different partners in the 
past year t – τ. Note that this also includes cases where a party has governed alone in the 
past, but now forms part of a coalition. 
 It gets values between 0 and 1 if only a share of the current coalition partners have 
cooperated in government in the past year t – τ. The value is then the share of current 
governing parties that have cooperated with party 𝑗𝑗 in that year.5 
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For single-party governments and new governing parties, different logics apply as a 
comparison of their current and past cooperation status is not straightforward. 
 Single-party governments: According to the argument, the policy-making outcomes of 
coalitions’ past cooperation patterns need to be compared to the outcomes of parties 
governing alone, i.e. not cooperating with other parties. Foremost, therefore, the effect of 
single-party governments versus coalitions is captured by a separate dummy variable. For 
the cooperation variable, single-party governments are simply assigned a constant value 
(whose exact level is technically irrelevant, due to the additional dummy variable). In 
accordance with the view that parties can be seen as durable, stable coalitions of societal 
interests (Aldrich 2011) with similar incentives like durable coalition governments to 
internalize fiscal preferences, parties governing alone in a given year get a maximum value 
of α=1. 
 New governing parties: Although they have not established any familiarity with other 
governing parties in the past, I assign new parties in government a maximum value of α=1. 
The reason is that otherwise the measure would “punish” a new party for not having 
participated in previous governments, even though it might be willing to collaborate and 
compromise in office. Its coalition partners, however, have a relative lack of familiarity 
with the new party, which reflects in a lower cooperation outlook for established parties. 
This is a compromise between the view that new parties should have low cooperation 
prospects due to their lack of familiarity with the established parties, and the view that new 
parties should have high cooperation prospects because they have never “betrayed” the 
established parties. 
These cases reveal that governing parties within one coalition may have different individual 
values of prospective cooperation. I argue that the foundation for durable cooperation depends 
on the elaborated amount of familiarity among all coalition partners, since, “no coalition 
government is stronger than its weakest link” (Bäck and Lindvall 2015, 58). The effects of 
familiarity on future cooperation prospects therefore prevail for the coalition as a whole; 
otherwise, some parties could impede debt stabilization agreements, lacking long-term 
cooperation perspectives. In a second step, the potential for prospective cooperation for a 
government in country 𝑖𝑖 in the year 𝑡𝑡 is thus the lowest value of prospective cooperation of any 
current governing party: 
 Prospective cooperationi,t  = min(Prospective cooperationi,j,t ) (2) 
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of prospective cooperation for each country, while also 
displaying the dynamics of debt ratios. In countries continuously ruled by one-party 
governments or unchanged coalitions, prospective cooperation always reaches the maximum 
value of 1 (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Malta, Spain and USA).6 In the rest of the 36 
democracies, prospective cooperation varies over time. For example, in the United Kingdom 
the conservative-liberal coalition government formed in 2010 has a lower potential for 
prospective cooperation because the Conservatives had governed alone since 1960, and the 
Liberals have no familiarity through shared governing experience with the Conservatives. 
Indeed, the Conservatives went back to governing alone after the elections in 2015. 
In Switzerland, another system of generally stable coalition patterns, with the same parties 
forming the government between 1959 and 2011, there is a surprising dip in 1995. This is 
because in our data source, the SVP was recoded to a right-populist party since 1995, and in 
effect became a “new” party (in an ideological sense). Thus, the expectations for the “old” 
parties for long-term cooperation with the new party are reduced. However, the indicator drops 
only moderately because three of the four parties can still count on a high amount of 
familiarity. 
Austria is an illustrative case to see the intuition of the indicator. Until 1982, after a long 
series of grand coalitions between 1947 and 1966, the SPÖ and ÖVP governed alone. In 1983, 
prospective cooperation decreases below 0.5 after the SPÖ for the first time entered a coalition 
with the FPÖ. The socialists thus have a high potential for “betrayal” against its partner 
because they had governed alone or with the ÖVP for such a long time. During the four-year 
government term, prospective cooperation slowly increases again. But it slightly decreases 
again in 1987 with the next grand coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP because the Social 
Democrats now have a betrayal potential against the Christian Democrats too. Until 2000, 
prospective cooperation steadily increases under consecutive grand coalitions. It then falls 
again with the first coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ in 2000. 
Japan is another demonstrative example. Until 1983, the Liberal Democrats governed 
alone. Between 1983 and 1986, and between 1994 and 2009, however, they had a series of 
small coalition partners. These have no familiarity because of the long-standing hegemony of 
the LDP and could not anticipate being a long-term part of a coalition government. Finally, the 
new accession countries of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe start from comparably high 
levels of prospective cooperation because their party systems are dominated by new parties 
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(Powell and Tucker 2014). However, there are also clear downward trends in countries like 
Estonia, Latvia or Slovenia because of unstable coalition patterns in the 2000s. Such downward 
trends, as well as increasing volatility over time, are observable on average over all countries. 
This can possibly be explained by party system changes, but in any case, the cross-national 
variation remains considerable.7 
Looking at bivariate associations reveals negative but rather weak correlations between 
country-level averages of prospective cooperation and debt changes: r=–0.07 (N=36, p=0.69) 
for all countries and r=–0.17 (N=30, p=0.38) excluding countries with permanent maximum 
values of prospective cooperation due to one-party governments. Correlation coefficients 
within countries are negative in 21 countries (significant on the 90%-level in Belgium, Croatia, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and UK) and 
insignificantly positive in 9 countries (p>0.1 in all countries). Average debt changes confirm 
the theoretical expectations. One-party governments (average annual debt change 0.85% of 
GDP, N=532) and coalition governments with high values for prospective cooperation (debt 
change 0.80% of GDP, N=412, prospective cooperation>0.78) both have substantially lower 
debt increases than coalitions with low values for prospective cooperation (debt change 1.80% 
of GDP, N=418). 
 
Control variables 
These bivariate correlations should be scrutinized in a multivariate model controlling for 
alternative influences on debt changes. The variables presented here allow a replication of the 
models in Bäck and Lindvall (2015). Their models in turn are based on the comprehensive 
empirical study by Franzese (2002, chapter 3). Control variables are from Armingeon et al. 
(2015c) and are described in detail in the online appendix. First, a number of economic control 
variables are introduced. The lagged values of debt changes and levels control for persistence 
of debt trajectories (see also a statistical motivation below). Also, higher debt growth should be 
immediately caused by higher unemployment levels and changes, lower GDP growth. Fiscal 
pressure, which hypothesis 3 expects to increase the effects of prospective cooperation, is 
operationalized as the leverage of GDP growth minus inflation minus nominal interest rates on 
lagged debt levels. Openness of the economy is not included in the main models as it proved 
insignificant. 
Second, election years (binary indicator, 1=election year) should temporarily lower the 
effects of prospective cooperation, according to hypothesis 2. Third, to disentangle cooperation 
effects from government stability (Bejar et al. 2011), I include a measure for government 
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duration based on the average duration of past government in days (applying a depreciation 
rate of 0.95). 
Fourth, the cabinet share of left-wing parties is included as a control variable. The 
expected effects are somewhat ambiguous and may depend on macroeconomic conditions 
(Cusack 1999). Fifth, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) associate minority governments (1=minority in 
parliament) with higher deficits, but this has been contested (de Haan and Sturm 1997). Sixth, 
according to hypothesis 4, the impact of prospective cooperation may be conditional on 
sufficiently centralized budget institutions under the control of strong finance ministers 
(Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). Thus, I include the “delegation index” by Hallerberg et al. 
(2009, 74) in some models. Data are available for 15 European countries and three time points 
only. I assign the value from 1991 backwards until 1960 and the value from 2000/2004 until 
2012. Values between 1991 and 2000/2004 are linearly interpolated. 
Finally, constitutional veto players need to be taken into account (Tsebelis 2002). I include 
indices for presidentialism (0=parliamentarism, 1/2/3=semi-presidentialism/hybrid systems, 
4=presidentialism), federalism (0=no, 1=weak, 2=strong) and bicameralism (1=unicameralism, 
2=weak bicameralism, 3=medium-strength bicameralism, 4=strong bicameralism). 
 
4. Method 
Standard political economy analyses often utilize pooled time-series cross-section regression 
methods (TSCS) using annual data. In this article, I use two approaches to study the association 
between governments’ prospective cooperation and changes in debt ratios. First, within the 
TSCS-framework, “autoregressive distributed lag” models are applied which enable to discern 
short- and long-run relations. Second, I use cabinets as the unit of observation instead of 
country-years to avoid some pitfalls of standard TSCS-analysis. 
 
TSCS-analysis 
Autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models enable one to identify the temporal impacts of 
governments’ cooperation patterns. An ADL model is a “general model” in the sense that it 
makes no restrictive a priori assumptions about the dynamic associations between X- and Y-
variables (Beck and Katz 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008). The model is specified as follows: 
 
 ∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, (3) 
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where ∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 is the annual change of general government debt in percentage of GDP and 
𝑿𝑿 is a vector of independent variables. 𝛽𝛽0 estimates the immediate short-term effect, 𝛽𝛽1 the 
effect of previous levels of 𝑿𝑿 on debt changes. Including the lagged dependent variable 𝛼𝛼1 
allows the calculation of long-run multipliers LRM = 𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1
1−𝛼𝛼1
 which estimate the total long-run 
effect of an impact variable 𝑿𝑿. 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
The estimation of the ADL with ordinary least squares regression depends upon four 
assumptions which tests show to be consistent. First, throughout the whole sample, the 
dependent variable seems to be stationary and not containing unit roots.8 Second, Lagrange 
multiplier tests find no significant serial correlation among the residuals.9 This avoids 
endogeneity bias risks by introducing the lagged dependent variable (Keele and Kelly 2006). 
Third, spatial correlation among the error terms and panel heteroscedasticity10 require the use 
of “panel-corrected” standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Fourth, tests hint that the data do 
not suffer from unobserved heterogeneity between countries.11 Therefore, no country fixed 
effects need to be included (the results explaining variation within coalition governments 
remain robust in fixed-effects models, however). To control for common exogenous shocks 
and time trends, I include a year counter, and its squared and cubic transformation. Results are 
substantially identical using year fixed effects. 
 
Government-centered analysis 
TSCS-data have a number of disadvantages. Their focus on annual short-term changes ignores 
that governing occurs with implementation lags. Moreover, government output is to some 
degree driven by electoral cycles, which naturally includes governmental changes in the middle 
of the calendar year. An alternative to TSCS-data is therefore to set the unit of observation at 
the cabinet level, so that each observation captures the relevant average characteristics of one 
government.12 Because cabinet duration varies greatly, I control for the number of days 
governments were in office. Models are estimated with OLS regression and panel-corrected 
standard errors. The main advantage using this cabinet-centered data structure is a more 
realistic focus of the government as a main actor shaping policy (Boix 1997; Obinger et al. 
2014). 
 
5. Results 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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The empirical evidence presented in this chapter is based firstly on ADL-models and then 
revisited with the government-centered data setting. The first model in Table 1, an economic 
baseline model, shows the expected debt increases when the economic situation deteriorates. 
Model 2 finds a significant positive association between coalitions and debt in the short-term, 
but no long-run relationship.13 As argued in this article, crucial variation seems to be located 
within coalition governments. Model 3, introducing the measure for prospective cooperation, 
finds a significant difference between coalitions with short and long time horizons. Coalitions 
with future cooperation prospects are associated with lower debt increases both in the short and 
the long run. In substantive terms, expected annual debt increases are about 1 percentage point 
lower, on average, if the value for prospective cooperation increases by one standard deviation 
(about 0.2 units). Moreover, coalitions with maximum cooperation prospects are now related to 
significantly lower debt changes in the long run compared to single-party governments (see 
below). 
While Model 4 completes the set of political and institutional control variables, the strong 
effects of prospective cooperation remain unaltered. Again, prospective cooperation has a 
substantial effect. In a hypothetical example, if the value for prospective cooperation decreased 
from 1 to 0.5, debt would grow from 80 percent to 128 percent of GDP within 20 years, all else 
equal.14 Impulse response functions (IRF) from Model 4 show that the effect of prospective 
cooperation is –2.68 in the first year, –1.66 in the second year, –0.34 in the third year, and –
0.07 in the fourth year (see the IRFs in Figure A4 in the online appendix). 
The coefficient for coalition governments – the difference between coalition and single-
party governments – needs to be interpreted conditionally on values of prospective cooperation 
since one-party governments always take the maximum value of 1.15 Figure 2 shows the 
marginal effects of coalition governments. In the short-run, debt growth under coalitions and 
one-party governments is not significantly different. In the long-run, however, coalitions with 
prospective cooperation values over 0.78 have significantly lower debt increases compared to 
one-party governments (on the 95%-level). These comprise more than 45 percent of all 
coalition governments. On the other hand, coalitions with a prospective cooperation score 
below 0.48 have significantly higher debt increases than single-party governments. These 
findings indicate – consistent with the main hypothesis – that the higher number of parties in 
coalitions does not directly lead to common pool problems, but, that coalitions with long time 
horizons can even be superior to single-party governments based on their ability to generate 
broad political support for controversial reform policies.16 
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[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The control variables show that – apart from a short-term impact – government duration is not 
significantly associated with lower debt increases. Federalism has the expected negative effect, 
while presidentialism and bicameralism show no clear, robust effects. Minority and left-wing 
governments are related to lower debt increases (cf. Alesina and Perotti 1995). 
Table 2 (regressions) and Table 3 (marginal effects) account for the possibility that the 
effect of prospective cooperation is conditioned by other explanatory factors. Model 5 shows 
that the effect of prospective cooperation is weakened in election years, but stronger in non-
election years, as expected in hypothesis 2 following the political business cycle logic. Model 6 
finds that prospective cooperation is most clearly related to lower debt growth when fiscal 
pressure is high. This provides some evidence for the assumption in the theoretical argument in 
hypothesis 3 that coalitions with a longer time horizon effectively care more about future debt 
costs. When the fiscal situation is comfortable, cooperation effects are weaker – presumably 
because governments can afford fiscal expansion without endangering long-run debt 
sustainability. Finally, Model 7 indicates that the impact of prospective cooperation is stronger 
with centralized budget process institutions and strong finance ministers (high delegation 
index, hypothesis 4). However, the data for delegation are suboptimal and the interaction 
between delegation and prospective cooperation is only narrowly significant on the 90%-level, 
which indicates that this finding should be tested more carefully in future research.17 
The results presented so far are robust to a variety of tests. First, revisiting measurement 
assumptions of prospective cooperation, any depreciation rate between δ=0.8 and δ=0.99 yields 
substantially identical long-run effects (see Figures A1 and A2 in the online appendix). Second, 
the results are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable, such as non-
extrapolated debt changes, total government expenditure or government deficits. Third, 
findings remain unchanged with the inclusion of other control variables (a dummy variable for 
governments consisting entirely of new parties; number of new parties in governments; total 
ministers as a proxy for the number of spending ministers; formal budgetary rules; openness of 
the economy; number of parties in government; effective number of parties in parliament; 
government support in parliament; or dummy variables for the Eurozone, caretaker or 
technocratic cabinets, oversized or minimal winning coalitions, and proportional representation 
electoral systems). Fourth, the results are robust to several alternative methodical choices.18 
With country fixed effects, the difference between single-party and coalition governments is 
not significant (Model A1 in the online appendix), but since these are within-group effects, all 
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countries with constant single-party, or more importantly, constant coalition government, are 
disregarded.  Fifth, there is only limited risk of endogeneity and reverse causality – i.e. debt 
shocks disarranging historical coalition patterns – since debt changes, especially in the long-
run, are not significantly leading to changes in prospective cooperation (Models A4 to A8 in 
the online appendix).A substantive issue concerns the assumption of parameter heterogeneity 
in pooled time-series analysis (Plümper et al. 2005). I construct five period dummies in order to 
test how the effect of prospective cooperation varies over time: a “Bretton-Woods” period 
(1962-1972); a “post-oil-shock” period (1973-1989); a “Maastricht” period (1990-1998) 
capturing increased volatility in the 1990s partly associated with the convergence efforts of the 
Maastricht treaty in Europe; a “Euro” period (1999-2007) witnessing the introduction of the 
common currency in the Eurozone; and a “Great Recession” period (2008-2013) capturing the 
economic crisis. These period dummies are interacted with the prospective cooperation 
variable. The regression coefficients are then standardized in order to compare the relative 
magnitude of the effects. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 shows that the substantive debt impact of prospective cooperation is greatest until the 
1980s, possibly because influencing the economy through Keynesian demand management was 
still feasible. The effect has been attenuated in the 1990s and 2000s. During the Great 
Recession since 2008, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small, which comes as no 
surprise since governments of all forms increasingly relied on austerity policies (Armingeon 
and Baccaro 2012). 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, Table 5 shows the results of the government-centered regression analysis which 
overcomes some drawbacks of TSCS-data. Model 8 is a replication of Model 4, while Model 9 
excludes the lagged dependent variable which theoretically makes less sense because cabinets 
should be more independent units of observation than country-years. The findings corroborate 
the effect of coalitions’ prospective cooperation: On average, throughout entire 
administrations, coalitions with a prospective cooperation score of 1 are associated with debt 
increases 2.1 percentage points lower than coalitions with scores of 0.5 (Model 9). But the 
results find no significant difference between single-party governments and coalitions with 
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high cooperation prospects. As argued in the theoretical section, broad coalitions are 
potentially better suited to implement debt stabilization policies with their ability to spread 
blame and policy accountability across several actors – yet they also need more time to agree 
on policy change. This implies that the average values used in this government-centered 
analysis may cloud these policy-making differences between coalitions and single-party 
governments. Indeed, when controlling for the variance of cabinets’ debt changes (expectedly 
higher under coalition governments) in Model 10, coalition governments with high cooperation 
outlooks are associated with significantly lower debt accumulation rates than one-party 
governments. These results remain robust when short-term governments, which were in office 
less than six months, are excluded. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Do durable cooperation patterns among governing parties help to keep debt dynamics in check? 
The evidence presented in this article, based on a comparison of 36 democracies over the time 
period from (up to) 1962 to 2013, shows that coalitions with high chances for “prospective 
cooperation” are indeed associated with lower debt increases – compared to both coalitions of 
parties less familiar through past shared-governing experience and to single-party governments. 
The assumptions behind the theoretical argument are that the familiarity gained from 
governing together increases the chance of future cooperation (Franklin and Mackie 1983; 
Martin and Stevenson 2001, 2010) and that those coalitions with governing prospects care 
about the future costs of debt. Under these conditions, for which I provide empirical support, 
incentives for coalition governments to externalize the future costs of debt are reduced 
significantly. Echoing a recent argument put forward by Bäck and Lindvall (2015), this 
challenges standard fragmentation and veto-player approaches, where long-term considerations 
by political actors are often absent (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Roubini and Sachs 1989; 
Tsebelis 2002). This is problematic since long-lasting cooperation might be a strategy to 
overcome some of the opportunity problems arising from intertemporal insecurity over future 
events (Lupia and Strøm 2008). 
Moreover, and going beyond Bäck and Lindvall (2015), I found some evidence that fiscal 
policy-making is not reducible merely to veto actor or common pool resource problems. The 
literature on consensus government highlights that the assumptions from veto player theories 
are often insufficient to incorporate issues of electoral support for controversial policies. In this 
view, broad and durable coalitions indeed have advantages over one-party governments to 
negotiate reform packages with a fairly balanced distribution of the burden and gains across 
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several societal groups and to share the blame for unpopular policy measures (Katzenstein 
1985; Lijphart 2012). 
Does cooperation stability have the same effects for ideologically broad coalitions (such as 
the grand coalitions in Austria, Germany, or Switzerland) as for ideologically narrower, but 
durable, coalitions (for example, the Swedish center-right alliance)? How do the distinct veto 
actor constellations between one-party and coalition governments affect their time 
requirements and timing to agree on policy change? Finally, do budgetary institutions, such as 
the delegation of fiscal authority to the finance minister, interfere with coalitions’ striving for 
fiscal policy agreements? These issues, not yet fully answered in this analysis, merit further 
study to better understand economic policy-making differences between one-party and multi-
party types of government. The evidence, though, is compelling that long-sighted coalition 
behavior pays off to reach particular policy goals. 
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Figure 1: Prospective cooperation and debt ratios, 1960-2013 
Note: Debt ratio of Bulgaria in 1993 (292%) reduced to 200% for graphical reasons. 
Source: Own calculations based on Armingeon et al. (2015b); Armingeon et al. (2015c).  
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Figure 2: Group difference between coalition and single-party governments 
Note: Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. Vertical grey lines show distribution of prospective cooperation 
(coalition governments only). Based on Model 4. 
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Table 1: ADL regressions of annual debt changes 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
ΔDebt ratio t-1 (LDV) 0.213*** (0.046) 0.216*** (0.046) 0.211*** (0.045) 0.203*** (0.045) 
Debt ratio t-1 -0.013** (0.006) -0.012** (0.006) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.006) 
Real GDP growth t -0.295*** (0.082) -0.291*** (0.082) -0.291*** (0.081) -0.301*** (0.081) 
Unemployment t 0.086** (0.038) 0.084** (0.038) 0.105*** (0.037) 0.119*** (0.037) 
ΔUnemployment t 0.839*** (0.164) 0.846*** (0.164) 0.812*** (0.162) 0.786*** (0.162) 
Fiscal pressure t 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Coalition government t   1.169** (0.519) 0.416 (0.601) -0.071 (0.611) 
Coalition government t-1   -1.104** (0.515) -1.303** (0.589) -1.277** (0.592) 
  LRM Coalition government   0.083 (0.247) -1.125*** (0.319) -1.691*** (0.374) 
Prospective cooperation t     -3.041** (1.491) -2.679* (1.474) 
Prospective cooperation t-1     -0.726 (1.497) -1.115 (1.472) 
  LRM Prospective cooperation     -4.775*** (0.826) -4.759*** (0.851) 
Election year t       0.585** (0.287) 
Election year t-1       0.571** (0.279) 
  LRM Election year       1.450*** (0.486) 
Government duration t       -0.006* (0.004) 
Government duration t-1       0.006* (0.004) 
  LRM Government duration       -0.000 (0.000) 
Minority government t       -0.547* (0.285) 
Left cabinet share t       -0.009** (0.003) 
Presidentialism t       0.021 (0.083) 
Federalism t       -0.521*** (0.140) 
Bicameralism t       0.305** (0.152) 
Time-trend 0.440** (0.195) 0.444** (0.195) 0.413** (0.195) 0.309 (0.194) 
Time-trend2 -0.018** (0.007) -0.019** (0.008) -0.018** (0.007) -0.014* (0.007) 
Time-trend3 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Constant -1.108 (1.507) -1.196 (1.519) 3.296* (1.841) 4.421** (1.851) 
R2 0.37  0.37  0.38  0.39  
N 1,210  1,210  1,210  1,210  
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests), panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2: ADL regressions of annual debt changes 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
ΔDebt ratio t-1 (LDV) 0.208*** (0.045) 0.225*** (0.045) 0.147*** (0.058) 
Debt ratio t-1 -0.022*** (0.006) -0.020*** (0.006) -0.040*** (0.010) 
Real GDP growth t -0.294*** (0.081) -0.308*** (0.081) -0.390*** (0.129) 
Unemployment t 0.116*** (0.037) 0.127*** (0.037) 0.262*** (0.069) 
ΔUnemployment t 0.789*** (0.160) 0.752*** (0.160) 0.862*** (0.260) 
Fiscal pressure t 0.004*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Fiscal pressure t-1   -0.009*** (0.003)   
  LRM Fiscal pressure   0.007** (0.003)   
Coalition government t -0.054 (0.609) 0.373 (0.624) 1.271 (0.811) 
Coalition government t-1 -1.253** (0.592) -1.623*** (0.608) -1.669** (0.772) 
  LRM Coalition government -1.650*** (0.376) -1.612*** (0.377) -0.467 (0.605) 
Prospective cooperation t -4.019*** (1.529) 0.002 (1.642) 2.924 (4.728) 
Prospective cooperation t-1 0.174 (1.534) -3.217* (1.658) 0.980 (4.674) 
  LRM Prospective cooperation -4.856*** (1.007) -4.148*** (0.967) 4.579 (2.933) 
Election year t -2.053* (1.218) 0.568** (0.285) 0.886** (0.392) 
Election year t-1 2.462** (1.217) 0.721** (0.280) 0.771** (0.383) 
  LRM Election year 0.516 (1.942) 1.662*** (0.490) 1.942*** (0.647) 
Prospective cooperation * election year t 3.093** (1.453)     
Prospective cooperation * election year t-1 -2.242 (1.439)     
  LRM Prospective cooperation * election year 1.074 (2.315)     
Prospective cooperation * fiscal pressure t   -0.014*** (0.003)   
Prospective cooperation * fiscal pressure t-1   0.011*** (0.003)   
  LRM Prospective cooperation * fiscal pressure   -0.005 (0.004)   
Delegation index t     11.229 (24.183) 
Delegation index t-1     -8.945 (23.602) 
  LRM Delegation     2.678 (4.198) 
Prospective cooperation * delegation t     -6.016 (7.700) 
Prospective cooperation * delegation t-1     -1.156 (7.539) 
  LRM Prospective cooperation * delegation     -8.411* (5.040) 
Government duration t -0.006* (0.004) -0.007** (0.003) -0.006 (0.005) 
Government duration t-1 0.006 (0.004) 0.006* (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) 
Minority government t -0.553* (0.285) -0.540** (0.275) -1.069* (0.567) 
Left cabinet share t -0.009** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.011** (0.005) 
Presidentialism t 0.021 (0.084) 0.017 (0.087) 0.060 (0.187) 
Federalism t -0.517*** (0.143) -0.498*** (0.144) -0.723*** (0.255) 
Bicameralism t 0.300** (0.152) 0.264* (0.149) 0.445 (0.275) 
Time-trend 0.306 (0.191) 0.307 (0.191) 0.291 (0.234) 
Time-trend2 -0.014* (0.007) -0.014* (0.007) -0.014 (0.009) 
Time-trend3 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 
Constant 4.428** (1.909) 3.651* (1.913) -0.298 (3.041) 
R2 0.40  0.42  0.43  
N 1,210  1,191  681  
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests), panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Conditional effects of prospective cooperation 
 Short-run Long-run (LRM) N Model 
Unconditional effect -2.679* (1.474) -4.759*** (0.851) 1,210 4 
No election year -4.019*** (1.529) -4.856*** (1.007) 1,210 5 
Election year -0.926 (1.728) -3.782* (1.956) 1,210 5 
High fiscal pressure (3rd quartile) -1.693 (1.555) -4.692*** (0.943) 1,191 6 
Medium fiscal pressure (median) 0.004 (1.642) -4.148*** (0.967) 1,191 6 
Low fiscal pressure (1st quartile) 1.351 (1.773) -3.716*** (1.126) 1,191 6 
High delegation index (max.) -2.490 (2.975) -2.991 (2.140) 681 7 
Medium delegation index (median) -0.325 (1.651) 0.037 (1.118) 681 7 
Low delegation index (min.) 1.540 (3.125) 2.644 (1.913) 681 7 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests), standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Time-varying effects of prospective cooperation 
Period LRM (total) LRM (election year) LRM (no election year) 
1962-1972 (“Bretton-Woods”) -0.341*** (0.107) -0.280 (0.796) -0.387*** (0.113) 
1973-1989 (“Post-oil shock”) -0.332*** (0.097) 0.076 (0.429) -0.367*** (0.112) 
1990-1998 (“Maastricht”) -0.203*** (0.063) -0.125 (0.322) -0.204*** (0.075) 
1999-2007 (“Euro”) -0.252*** (0.069) -0.630** (0.354) -0.213*** (0.078) 
2008-2013 (“Great Recession”) -0.171** (0.078) -0.064 (0.435) -0.165* (0.085) 
Note: Standardized coefficients: Bi = βi(si/sy).* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests), standard errors in 
parentheses. Based on Models 4 and 5. 
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Table 5: Regressions of average debt changes per government 
 Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  
ΔDebt ratio Gov_t-1 (LDV) 0.206*** (0.066)     
Debt ratio Gov_t-1 -0.023*** (0.008) -0.021** (0.009) -0.028*** (0.009) 
Variance Δdebt ratio     0.024*** (0.004) 
Real GDP growth -0.216* (0.111) -0.255** (0.113) -0.506*** (0.176) 
Unemployment 0.083* (0.049) 0.120** (0.047) 0.161*** (0.060) 
ΔUnemployment 1.026*** (0.240) 0.942*** (0.243) 0.324 (0.323) 
Fiscal pressure 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Coalition government -0.539 (0.442) -0.735 (0.462) -1.180** (0.508) 
Prospective cooperation -3.527* (1.819) -4.290** (1.853) -5.676*** (1.902) 
Government duration 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Minority government -0.455 (0.388) -0.414 (0.403) -0.365 (0.464) 
Left cabinet share -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) 
Presidentialism -0.052 (0.099) -0.063 (0.100) -0.159 (0.160) 
Federalism -0.442** (0.195) -0.465** (0.202) -0.520** (0.251) 
Bicameralism 0.332** (0.160) 0.338* (0.175) 0.503** (0.229) 
Time-trend 0.363** (0.157) 0.548*** (0.138) 0.559*** (0.190) 
Time-trend2 -0.017*** (0.007) -0.025*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.007) 
Time-trend3 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Days in office -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 
Constant 3.432 (2.198) 3.297 (2.327) 5.188* (2.828) 
R2 0.45  0.43  0.51  
N 494  496  333  
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-sided tests), panel-corrected standard errors in 
parentheses. Unit of observation: cabinets. All variables are average values per cabinet. Only 
governments in office at least 6 months considered (results are robust if more short-lived 
governments are included, too). 
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Otherwise parties’ familiarity levels would be punished merely for not having participated in governing coalitions. 
6 The presidential systems of Cyprus and USA are continuously treated as single-party governments. 
7 In general, cooperation outlooks are higher at the beginning of the measurement periods due to governments 
consisting entirely of new parties, which have maximum cooperation prospects. As an empirical robustness test, I 
therefore included a dummy variable for “new governments”. In addition, Model A3 in the online appendix 
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countries and for Spain. This is most likely due to the low statistical power for these cases with a smaller N than 
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9 p>0.5, calculated after Beck and Katz (1996, 9). 
10 As shown by Pesaran tests for cross-sectional dependence and Wald tests for panel heteroskedasticity. 
11 Some Hausman tests found significant unit heterogeneity. However, it turns out that this is mostly due to the 
variables federalism and bicameralism. Seldom constitutional changes lead to largely different coefficients in 
fixed effects within-regressions. Excluding these two variables, no need for fixed effects is indicated (p>0.5). 
12 Government changes are identified by elections, resignation of prime ministers, coalition break-ups, lack of 
parliamentary support or intervention by the head of state (Armingeon et al. 2015b). 
13 Standard errors of the long-run multipliers (LRM) were calculated using the Bewley transformation (De Boef 
and Keele 2008, 191-92). 
14 Based on the formula for compound interest: 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+20 = 80(1 + 2.38100)20 = 128.05 
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16 Bäck and Lindvall (2015) also find evidence for this coalition effect in some models, but their evidence is 
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17 Delegation data are available only for 15 countries and two/three time points. 
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